近期，我院刘奕副教授与合作者的论文“The Role of Lockups in Stock Mergers”在经济管理领域顶级期刊《Management Science》上正式发表。《Management Science》期刊创办于1954年，由美国运筹学与管理学学会主办，是经济管理领域历史悠久、口碑极高的顶级期刊，并被广泛收录于各种国际顶级期刊目录，如UTD24, FT50和ABS(4*), 其2023年影响因子为4.6，近五年影响因子为6.1。

论文摘要

本文记录了股票锁定在以股票作为支付方式的并购（M&A）交易中的频繁使用，并研究了影响股票锁定使用及其期限的因素和后果。在以股票作为支付方式的并购交易中，股票锁定限制了被收购方股东在并购交易后指定期限内出售收购方所发行股票的交易行为。如果被收购方股东认为并购的长期基本面强劲，则会同意使用股票锁定。文章发现，采用股票锁定的收购方在宣布并购时获得更好的市场反馈，尤其是在收购方估值较高的情况下；事先来看，收购方估值越高，采用股票锁定的可能性越大。此外，股票锁定还使得交易完成的可能性更高，并购谈判时间更短，以及长期经营业绩更好。总体来说，市场将股票锁定视为强劲基本面的信号，尤其是在收购方估值较高时。

We document the frequent use of stock lockup agreements in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) paid in stock and examine the corporate determinants and consequences of the use and duration of lockups. Lockup agreements prohibit target shareholders from selling shares issued by the acquirer as a means of payment for a prespecified period. We find support for the hypothesis that target shareholders agree to lockups to precommit to hold on to the acquirer’s stock if they believe the merger’s long-term fundamentals are strong. Consistent with our hypothesis, lockups come with larger acquirer announcement returns, particularly when acquirer valuations are high; ex ante, lockup adoption likelihood increases with acquirers’ valuation. Lockups also come with higher deal completion likelihood, shorter merger negotiations, and higher long-term operating performance. We conclude the market interprets lockups as a signal of strong fundamentals, particularly when acquirers’ valuations are high.

作者介绍

刘奕，经济与管理研究院金融与会计系副教授；先后获西北农林科技大学管理学学士学位、英国伦敦国王学院会计与财务管理硕士学位和金融学博士学位；研究领域聚焦于企业并购、供应链关系管理以及资本结构等；所授课程包括财务报告分析和会计学。