Title: Structual Intercention of Social Ties

Speaker:Dr. Yang Sun Research Fellow, Sichuan University

Time:14:00 - 15:30 2018.9.28（Friday）

Venue:Yide building H412 Liulin Campus

Abstract

This paper examines the impacts of structural intervention on individual's equilibrium behavior in the framework proposed by Ballester et al. (2006). We use minimal information, centrality measures of the players involved in the intervention, to characterize individuals' behavioral perturbations caused by a structural intervention. This characterization heavily relies on the fact that any structural intervention is outcome equivalent to a corresponding changing on the characteristics of the players involved in the structural intervention. Compared with recomputing the equilibrium of the intervened network game, this characterization simplifies the calculation by reducing the dimension of calculation especially when the structural intervention is sparse".

As an application of this result, we investigate the behavioral perturbation caused by building up a bridge between isolated networks. We construct an exact index to identify the key bridge players, linking up whom results in increasing aggregate activity the most. We illustrate that, by an example, the key bridge players may consist of neither each group's key player nor central player because both centrality and self-loop of bridge players contribute to aggregate effort.

We then investigate the network formation process in which a planner arranges links in the population sequentially and we show that the efficient networks (as well as the most active networks) are nested split networks.

Finally, we consider the policies aiming at optimally removing a group in a network. As a generalization of Ballester et al. (2006)'s key player result, we use the indexes in the original network to construct a measure to rank the impacts of the removal of a group on aggregate activity.

About the speaker

Dr. Yang SunResearch Fellow, Sichuan University

研究领域: 博弈论，社交网络，公司治理

博弈论 工作论文：

A revelation principle for perfect correlated equilibrium (with X. Luo and Y. Qiao)

The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium (with X. Luo, X. Qian)

公司治理 工作论文：

Moral hazard on networks (with W. Zhao).

社交网络 工作论文：

Structural interventions of social ties (with W. Zhao, J. Zhou);

Network games with incomplete information (with W. Zhao).